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Abstract 
Entry into force of the law no.202/2010 regarding some measures to speed up the trial processes already raises 
some problems of interpretation especially concerning cases that are pending. Such a situation was inevitable 
since the transitional provisions could not cover all situations arising in practice, and the law mentioned above 
create  some  completely  new  institutions  in  our  criminal  law.  But  I  believe  that  for  the  new  institution  of 
admitting  guilt  in  court  case,  would  be  required  to  adopt  transitional  rules  necessary  to  eliminate  the 
controverses that arise and will arise in practice. As any new institution, admitting guilt in court case will 
require a certain period of time untill crystallize an unitary practice field, even more because the text contains 
some vague expressions. Unfortunately, the courts have no benefit yet of a fast and efficient mechanism for 
unifying the jurisprudence, and this fact will probably affect also the solutions that will be taken by the courts in 
this matter. 
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Introduction
Under  the  statement  of  reasons  in  the  Law  no.  202/2010,  regarding  some  measures  for 
speeding  up  the  cases  settlement  it  has  been  illustrated  that:  ”the  introduction  in  the  Code  of 
Criminal Procedure of a new institution, such as the institution of trial in case of pleading guilty, 
satisfies the need of efficacy of the judgment, contributing to the annulment of some time consuming 
procedures  and  often  useless  for  establishing  the  legal  truth,  subsuming  to  the  qualitative 
requirements of the act of justice”.
However, the entry into force of the Law no. 202/2010, stirred up numerous discussions amid 
the  practitioners  and  it  has  already  generated  a  series  of  interpretation  problems  in  the  judicial 
practice, especially regarding the application of this law to the pending cases, under process of 
settlement, as long as the above-mentioned law has introduced some completely new institutions in 
our criminal law, and the provisional measures could not cover all the possible situations occurred 
into practice.  
Under the marginal title “The judgement in case of pleading guilty”, the new art. 320
1 of the 
Criminal procedure code provides that “until the initiation of the court investigation, the accused can 
declare either personally of by means of an authentic document that he / she acknowledges to have 
been committed the incriminated actions recorded in the court notification instrument and asks for 
the judgement to be settled based on the evidence submitted to the file in the stage of criminal 
investigation” (art. 320
1 paragraph 1 Code of criminal proc.). In the case of applying this procedure 
“the court shall decide on the conviction of the accused, who benefits of the remission by one third of 
the limits  of the sentence provided  by  the law, in the case of  sentence to  imprisonment, and a 
remission by one fourth of the limits of the sentence provided by the law, in the case of punishment by 
administrative fine” (art. 320
1 paragraph 7 C. criminal proc.). 
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Regarding the application of the new art. 320
1 of the Code of crim. proc., regulating the trial 
procedure in case of pleading guilty, as far as concerning the cases pending at the effective date of 
this  text  of  law,  these  provisions  are  susceptible  of  being  interpreted  differently  in  the  judicial 
practice, as there are possible several solutions, depending on the procedural stage of the case, on the 
accused position as to that moment, on the criminal plurality registered in the case and on the legal 
frame of the action. 
Thus, one of the problems that have occurred was the one of the moment up to which the 
accused can plead guilty and what consequence causes the fact that the request of being judged based 
on the evidence gathered during the criminal prosecution is submitted after the initiation of the court 
investigation. 
In the cases where the court investigation has not been initiated yet, and before the procedural 
moment up to which pleading guilty can become incidental (the initiation of the court investigation), 
the accused can use, beyond any discussion, of the provisions of the art. 320
1 Code of criminal 
procedure,  operating  the  rule  of  immediate  application  of the  norms  of  criminal  procedure  law 
(tempus regit actum).
In the cases where the court investigation has begun or such procedural stage has not been 
reached, and the accused did not admit his guilt, it is not yet a matter of pleading guilty. 
However,  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  legal  provisions  called  forth  presupposes  both  the 
hypothesis where, in the cases pending with the courts of law, where the court investigation has 
begun, the accused admitted to have committed the deed ever since the criminal prosecution stage, 
stating this position also in front of the court, as well as the case when, the accused has not pleaded 
guilty during the criminal prosecution stage, but, after the initiation of the court investigation, he 
understands to reconsider the procedural position in the sense of admitting his / her guilt, thus as, 
although,  as  procedural  stage,  there  has  been  exceeded  the  moment  of  initiating  the  court 
investigation, the accused requires to be applied the new procedure.
According to the opinion of theoreticians of law as well as to the practice of the courts, there 
is a first trend that considers that the accused is not automatically granted the right to benefit of the 
provisions of the art. 320
1 Code of criminal procedure, from the very moment of the enforcement of 
this text, regardless of the considered hypothesis, resulting from the above-illustrated facts.  
In supporting this opinion and the solutions passed by the courts in this sense, there is, firstly, 
the argument, according to which, one must consider the fact that the criminal trial has exceeded the 
procedural moment up to which the accused could plead guilty and could admit committing the 
crimes and when he could ask for the judgement to be done based on the evidence submitted to the 
file in the criminal prosecution stage (initiation of the court investigation).  
The deadline established by the legislator that is until the initiation of the court investigation, 
is equal to the expiration of a time-limit. This presupposes that any statement formulated after the 
initiation of the court investigation must be dismissed as belated. 
This  is  because  the  criminal  trial  must  carry  out  operatively,  without  interruptions  and 
reinstatements to the prior stages, and a reinstatement to a previous stage or procedural phase is 
likely  solely  in  the  cases  in which  the  law  expressly  stipulates  such  action  (i.e. in  the  case  of 
cassation for re-judgement or in the case of reopening the criminal investigation). 
However, the accused whose decision has been quashed or cancelled in one of the remedies at 
law, and the case has been sent to be re-judged by the court of first instance, he/she can make use or 
not make use of this procedure depending on the limits, in which the decision is cancelled and of the 
last valid procedural instrument, from which point on the criminal trial must be recessed. 
Another  argument  of  those  supporting  the  above-opinion  is  that,  the  rule  of  immediate 
enforcement of the procedural criminal law cannot be ignored and cannot have a retroactive character 
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retroactivity of the new procedural criminal law cannot be accepted under any circumstances, as it is 
not allowed by the art. 15 paragraph 2 of the Constitution, providing the possibility of retroactivity 
only for the criminal law but nor for the procedural criminal law. 
It is appreciated that, in the case of a succession of procedure laws the discrimination cannot 
be called forth, as the procedure law applies immediately to all the persons in the same procedural 
stage, without any discrimination. However, the accused whose court investigation has proceeded 
face a different situation than those not yet in that procedural stage, and the possibility to ask for the 
judgement solely based on the evidence submitted during the criminal prosecution granted only to 
the later ones, does not represent a discriminatory act.   Thus, it would mean that the new procedure 
law  would  apply  to  all  the  persons  facing  the  same  situation,  including  those  that  have  been 
definitively convicted, which is deemed to be absurd. 
Besides, if there would be adopted the contrary solution it would mean that the judgement 
procedure for the case of pleading guilty would be applicable, including in the case of the files under 
the appeal or recourse stage, such a point of view being less likely to be generally accepted. 
  In analysing the incidence of the art. 320
1 paragraph 7 Code of crim. pr. in the case of the 
files already under investigation with the court at the date of entering into force of such Code, one 
cannot simply ignore the fact that this norm is not one effective on its own, without entailing any 
condition, but a norm whose incidence is conditioned by the performance of a certain procedural 
action of the accused, that is the acknowledgement of the facts by the accused and his/her request, 
made prior to the initiation of the court investigation, that the judgement shall be done based on the 
evidence submitted during the criminal prosecution stage.  
However, it is considered that, in the cases where the court investigation started before the 
effective date of this new art. 320
1 Code of crim. pr. this condition is not complied with and it can no 
longer be complied with. If the courts would only apply the art. 320
1 paragraph 7 Code of crim. pr., 
without considering the fact that the conditions under the paragraph 1/6 of the same article are not 
complied  with,  the  result  would  be  that  the  provisions  of  the new  law  and the  old  law  would 
combine, thus giving birth to a new law (lex tertia), which is not admissible. 
Thus, the surpassing of the procedural moment up to which the perpetration expression of will 
can intervene, entails the inapplicability of that cause providing the lack of sentence or the remission, 
and any likely changes in the accused plead, occurred subsequent to that moment, are ineffective, 
therefore, if the court investigation proceeded and if any evidence have been served to the court, the 
judgement cannot no longer be grounded on the evidence submitted during the criminal prosecution 
stage.
There is however a new approach of some courts who have admitted that both the accused 
acknowledging their actions since the criminal prosecution stage can benefit of the provisions of the 
art. 320
1Code of crim. proc., maintain this position in front of the court, even if, by reference to the 
effective date of the new legal provisions, the starting date of the court investigation had passed, as 
well as the accused who, although have not pleaded guilty during the criminal prosecution stage, 
have changed their procedural position understanding to acknowledge their action and asking for the 
judgement to be carried out according to the new regulated procedure. 
Practically speaking, as we talk about a law containing also provisions of substantial criminal 
law – as it provides a ground for remission by one third of the limits of the sentence provided by the 
law, in the case of sentence to imprisonment, and a remission by one fourth of the limits of the 
sentence  provided  by the  law,  in  the  case  of  punishment  by  administrative  fine  –  it  can  apply 
retroactively, as this is a more favourable law.  
Regarding the criteria for differentiating between the norms of substantial criminal law and 
the ones of criminal procedure, in the doctrine, we have a unanimous opinion according to which the 
placement of such norms in the Criminal Code or Criminal Procedure Code does not represent a 
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procedure code does not represent an impediment for its assessment as a norm of substantial criminal 
law, susceptible of being, thus, retroactively applied, if it is more favourable. 
Even if the constitutional provisions contained in the art. 15 paragraph 2 stipulate that the 
,,law orders only for the future, except for the more favourable criminal law (...)”, we consider that 
the reasoning of the legislator upon the drafting of such norm was to provide the possibility to 
retroactively  apply  any  criminal  law  or  procedural  criminal  law,  containing  more  favourable 
provisions. 
An extensive interpretation of the constitutional law provisions is required, in the sense that, 
even if the text does not expressly stipulate that the criminal procedural law can also retro-activate, 
we must accept that, if we talk about the remission of the sentence limits, any law, whether criminal 
or procedural criminal law, is subject to retroactivity. 
The legislator did not refer to the constitutional law provisions of the art.15 paragraph2 and to 
the criminal procedural law, as the remission of the sentence limits, fall under the matter of criminal 
law,  the  provisions  of  the  art.  320
1  Code  of  crim.  proc.  being  the  first  procedural  provisions 
containing norms of criminal substantial law. 
We deemed as compulsory the interpretation of the art. 320
1 paragraph 7 Code of crim. proc., 
as it is a norm concerning the quantum of the sentence applicable to certain offences or crimes, to be 
further framed beyond any doubt in the category of the criminal substantial law, and not in the 
category of the criminal procedural norms category. 
Besides, the finality of norms edicting by the legislator is represented by the granting of a 
right, being excluded the fact that the above-mentioned legal provision regulates any formalities, the 
actual result to which the application of this legal provision leads to targeting the criminal liability 
that can be decreased. 
Thus, as far as a norm, by its actual application on the case referred to judgement, regardless 
of the law section it belongs to, introduces a change in the incrimination conditions, in the conditions 
of charging the criminal  liability or in the sanctions, shall fall under the incidence of the more 
favourable law (mitior lex).  
We also consider that, in the case of some accused that caused criminal offenses at the same 
date, it would be deemed as discriminating if the judgments passed by the courts to be different, in 
the sense of considering as incidental or not the provisions of the art.320
1 Code of crim. proc., 
depending on the expedience of a criminal investigation authority in more effectively run through the 
procedural stages and phases of research and /or execution of the criminal prosecution. 
Even more discriminating would be considered the different judgments in a trial in process of 
settlement, if the accused had committed a criminal offense for which he/she is judged by the court, 
while another accused that has committed a criminal offence long before the previously-referred to 
accused,  either  a  similar  offence,  or  a  different  offence,  but  due  to  a  more  complex  criminal 
participation, or due to the fact that the crime has been committed in a series of criminal offences, 
circumstances which, due to the case complexity, resulted in a longer criminal investigation. 
We consider that, in the given situation, such a treatment would be a discriminating one, as 
long as the causes generating it are as objective as it gets, being obviously not imputable to the 
accused. Thus, we get to the situation in which the accused that committed a single criminal offence, 
related to which the evidence service did not require a long period of time, hence the file has been 
referred for settlement by the competent court, will not benefit of the new simplified procedure, 
while other accused that have committed the criminal offence long before the other accused, will 
benefit of the simplified procedure of pleading guilty. 
For this purpose, we called forth the Decision no. 86/27.02.2003 of the Constitutional Court, 
establishing that the provisions of the art. 8 of the Law no. 543/2002 regarding the pardoning for 
certain sanctions and the removal of some measures and sanctions that are unconstitutional, because 
they limit the application of the law for sanctions established by means of final court decisions, 
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for actions committed before such date. In grounding the decision the Constitutional Court showed 
that the situations of certain categories of persons should basically differ for justifying the difference 
in the legal treatment and such difference should be based on an objective and rational criterion. 
Another  issue  of  interpretation  and  application  is  the  one  regarding  the  disjunction  and 
incompatibility, and it concerns the case where in the same case there are two or more accused with 
different pleadings: one or several acknowledging to have committed the criminal offence described 
in the indictment and requesting the case settlement based on the evidence submitted to the file 
during the criminal prosecution and another one or ones not recognising to have committed the 
criminal offence or not requesting the application of the art. 320
1 paragraphs 1-6 Code of crim. proc. 
From the text analysis, it results that the legislator did not expressly provide the coercitiveness 
to disjoint the case in such a situation, as provided under paragraph 5 of the art. 320
1 of the Code of 
crim. proc. for the case where evidence are required for the settlement of the civil action.  
Although we do not deal with an imperative provision that would establish the coercitiveness 
of the case disjunction, in the case where any of the criminal participation forms is held and the 
procedural position of the participants to the offence is different, the court can decide the disjunction, 
only  when  possible.  In  such  case,  the  court  shall  proceed  according  to  the  rules  of  simplified 
procedure for those that comply with the conditions, ordering by its decision the case disjunction for 
the other accused parties. 
The accused sentenced on the grounds of “pleading guilty” can be heard as witnesses in the 
disjoint case, in relation to the other accused parties.  
The  judge  passing  the  sentence  for  convicting  the  accused,  according  to  the  simplified 
procedure,  can  find  himself/herself  incompatible  to  judge  the  case  of  the  other  participant  to 
committing the criminal offence.  
Based on this interpretation of the text of law, included in a study published by the Superior 
Council of Magistracy, some courts facing such a situation declared themselves incompatible to 
judge the accused towards whom they ordered the case disjunction. 
Considering the rule established by the art. 32 Code of crim. pr., text providing that, the case 
disjunction would not represent the best solution, in case of indivisibility or joint cases, the first 
instance judges all the cases, if the court settles all the criminal offences and all the accused.  
Even if the art. 38 Code of crim. pr. allows the disjunction in the cases of incompatibility 
provided under art. 33 let. a) and in all the joint cases, one should not forget the basic rule, that is, in 
such situations the cases it operates and prevails the case joining, and the disjunction is merely the 
exception.
The only case that might be taken into account is the one regulated by the art. 47 paragraph 2 
of the same code, which provides the fact that the judge who has pre-empted on the judgement that 
might be reached in the case can no longer participate to the case settlement. 
According to the legal provision quoted above, the judge that, prior to the case settlement, 
pre-empts on the merits of the case is incompatible for judging the case. It is of no importance if the 
pre-emption occurred  before the appointment  or during the  trial, if it has happened during  first 
instance or in during the redress procedures, if it happened in an official environment or in an 
occasional case.  
By using the word “settlement”, the legislator referred to the situation in which the judge 
determined on the existence of the criminal action and on the guilt of the accused, and not to other 
situations  such  as  the  change  of juridical  framing of the  offence, the  extension  of the  criminal 
judgement on other material actions, on other deeds or on other persons. In fact, in both the doctrine 
and the practice, the opinion according to which the judge that has previously settled the criminal law 
part of the trial is not incompatible for settling also the disjoint civil part is the majority opinion. 
By relating to the provisions of the art. 33 let. a) and art. 34 Code of crim. pr., if we take into 
account the situation in which there was a criminal participation when the criminal offence was 
committed, all the persons have been sent to judgment, and, prior to the commencement of the court 147
investigation three of the accused have requested to be judged based on the simplified procedure, 
while the other accused have not pleaded guilty, if the case is disjoint, the court must order the 
conviction of the three persons, applying the provisions of the art.320
1 and the disjunction related to 
the other two accused, that will be judged by a different panel of judges.  
If, in this case, there exists a prejudice, the means of settling the civil action shall be an 
extremely difficult one, in the context in which the three accused, that have chosen to benefit of the 
new procedure implied by pleading guilty, do not challenge the prejudice, precisely because the 
modality established in the indictment is a convenient one for them, considering the rule of solidarity 
operating between the debtors. 
In such a case, will the court jointly convict solely the three accused that have opted for 
calling forth the new legal procedure in their favour, further the solidarity being established on the 
occasion of convicting the other two accused, or will it disjoint, regarding the three accused, the civil 
matter settling it together with the criminal matter that concerns the other two accused, as well? 
Moreover, we have to consider the issue of what happens in the case where, on the occasion 
of judging the two accused, shall there be ascertained that the entire prejudice has been caused by the 
three accused that have benefited of the procedure of pleading guilty, and, in relation to them, has the 
criminal court decision, establishing the fault or the contribution to the prejudice, remained final? 
We consider that the answer to the two above-posed questions is represented by the fact that, 
in a case like the above-illustrated one, the disjunction is not the best solution, therefore, in such a 
case, when the legal conditions are complied with, for the accused choosing the simplified procedure 
the court shall have to limit to admitting the judgement based on the evidence serviced during the 
criminal prosecution stage, and the judgement for these accused shall be passed concurrently to the 
one of the accused judged according to the ordinary procedure. 
There is, however, the case when, due to different reasons, the case disjunction could not be 
possible. In this hypothesis, a pertinent question would be can the court dismiss the request of an 
accused to apply the simplified procedure, only because the other one does not agree?  
Practically, in case there is a criminal offence committed by several authors and one of the 
accused  intends  to  benefit  of  the  simplified  procedure,  acknowledging  the  committing  of  such 
offence based on the evidence serviced during the criminal prosecution and the other accused opts for 
the ordinary procedure of settling his case, and, thus, we have a case in which the disjunction is 
impossible, if the case reaches the stage of court investigation and the evidence is submitted to the 
file pending with the court, can it still be supported the compliance with the premise for applying the 
remission of the sanctions limits, according to the art. 320
1 paragraph 7, if the case has not been 
settled solely based on the evidence serviced during the criminal prosecution?  
In this case, considering the argument related to the indivisible nature of the norm provided 
under art. 320
1 Code of crim. pr. and to the impossibility of applying the paragraph 7 of the same 
article in case of concurrent non-application of the paragraphs 1-6, we consider that the accused 
pleading guilty should neither benefit of the remission of the sanction.  
Nevertheless, in this case, the difference of legal treatment between the two accused is to be 
carried out, like before the effective date of the new art. 320
1 Code of crim. pr., by applying the 
sanction particularization criteria or by holding the mitigating circumstances for the accused pleading 
guilty of committing the actions indicated in the indictment.  
However, we  ask  ourselves  if  it  is equitable  and  non-discriminating  that the accused  who 
intended to benefit of the simplified procedure should receive a conviction the only mitigating factor 
applicable to his case being the mitigating circumstances for his honest attitude and for acknowledging 
his/her deed. It is obvious that, although this accused agrees that the judgement shall only be carried out 
based  on  the  evidence  serviced  during  the  criminal  prosecution,  finds  himself/herself  in  the 
impossibility of making use of the simplified procedure due to causes independent of his/her will, as 
long as the second accused (co-author to committing the criminal offence) understands to adopt a 
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On one hand, due to the occurrence of a cause independent of his/her will, the accused should 
be able to benefit of the new procedure. On the other hand, as long as the other accused does not 
acknowledge the guilt of committing the criminal offence, thus, the criminal trial must follow its 
course in front of the court, the file enters the stage of court investigation and other evidence is 
implicitly serviced during the criminal trial, thus that the first accused could no longer call forth the 
provisions of the simplified procedure. It is a situation that the judiciary practice must solve by 
adopting a majority solution in this sense. 
It is true that the doctrine and jurisprudence have accepted the possibility of combining more 
favourable provisions stipulated under different laws, when such provisions concern institutions that 
are susceptible of being applied autonomously, such as, for example, the case of multiple criminal 
offences, where there shall be selected the more favourable law for each offence separately, and 
further there shall be selected that sanctioning treatment for multiple criminal offences, provided by 
successive laws, which is more favourable. Is, however, the institution of guilt acknowledgement, 
regulated  by  the  art.  320
1  paragraphs  1-6  Code  of  crim.  pr.  one  susceptible  of  being  applied 
autonomously of the institution of the cause of sanction remission, provided under paragraph 7 of the 
same article? Does the norm provided under art. 320
1 Code of crim. pr. have a divisible nature, 
allowing a separate application of the paragraph 7 of this article, independent of the special procedure 
of pleading guilty, regulated under the paragraphs 1-6 of the same article? We believe that the answer 
to  such  questions can only be a negative  one, as,  according  to all  the  criteria  proposed  by  the 
doctrine, the norm provided under the art. 320
1 has indivisible nature, and the application of the 
sanction  remission  cause,  provided  under  paragraph  7  of  this  article  to  be  conditioned  by  the 
application of the separate procedure of acknowledging the guilt, regulated by the paragraphs 1-6 of 
this article.  
Thus, in the foreign doctrine, there has been ascertained that “the milder provisions of the new 
law are a sort of a counterparty to the more severe provisions the two series of provisions are trying 
to balance, therefore the two series of provisions cannot be applied independently one of another”.
However, it is obvious the legislator’s intention to grant a “compensation” consisting in the remission 
of sanction only to that accused that pleaded guilty and facilitated a more efficient settlement of the 
criminal trial by the request of settling the case based on the evidence serviced during the criminal 
prosecution. 
We deduce this also from the fact that the simple acknowledgement of guilt, without the 
judgement carried out based on the evidence gathered during the criminal prosecution (due to various 
reasons, including the dismissal of the request by the court, according to art. 320
1 paragraph 8 Code 
of crim. pr.), does not lead to the remission of the quantum of the sanctions applicable to the accused. 
Another  problem  in  applying  the  provisions  of  the  art.  320
1  Code  of  crim.  pr.  is  the 
significance of the verb”to hear”.
There are opinions according to which the hearing is carried out after the court has previously 
informed the accused on all the consequences deriving from opting for the simplified procedure, 
followed by the reading of the intimation.  
It has been considered that this hearing focuses on admitting the actions described in the 
indictment and on accepting the evidence serviced during the criminal prosecution and that is does 
not have the legal nature of an evidence (not being applicable the provisions of the art. 69-74 Code of 
crim. pr.), representing but a mandatory procedural activity required for establishing the procedural 
frame, being placed at the time of prior matters, before admitting the claim for judgement, according 
to the procedure provided under art. 320
1 Code of crim. pr.  
The mandatory nature of this procedural activity is correlated with the accused right to opt for 
the simplified procedure. The supporters of this opinion have accepted the fact that this simplified 
procedure can carry out by default, in the absence of the accused, if the legal requirements are 
complied, in the hypothesis in which the acknowledgement has been made by means of an authentic 
deed.149
However, this opinion, presents some drawbacks, that we shall further detail: 
Placing the action of hearing the accused at the time of prior matters not correct. From the art. 
44 Code of crim. pr., marginally called “prior matters”, it results that: ” The criminal court has the 
competence to try any prior matter on which the resolution of the case depends, even if, by its nature, 
that matter falls under the competence of another court. The prior matter is tried by the criminal 
court according to the rules and probative means regarding the field to which the matter belongs. 
The final decision of the civil court on a circumstance that represents prior matter in the criminal 
trial has authority of res iudicata in front of the civil court.”.
The text of the art. 44 Code of crim. pr., illustrates the fact that, there is no provision on the 
procedural moment when the accused can call forth this matter and that this moment can occur 
whenever during the criminal trial, both in the prosecution stage (see art. 45 Code of crim. pr.), as 
well as in the judgment stage (both before and after the court investigation initiation). 
The hearing of the accused, provided under art. 320
1 Code of crim. pr., even if, apparently, 
has the value of a simple statement of acknowledgement, it cannot be reduced to it. It cannot be 
carried out by omitting the fact that the judgment stage is governed by certain rules. These rules 
require an active role to both the judge and prosecutor, and provide the right of the other parties to 
ask questions. 
As a matter of fact, the hearing of the accused must be placed in the context established by the 
Code of criminal procedure. After analysing the order of the legal texts it results that, in a criminal 
trial, the order of the activities shall be the following: 
- according to the art. 320 C. cr. pr., the chairman shall explain to the damaged person that 
he/she can have the capacity of party in a civil trial or it can participate as damaged person in the 
criminal trial; 
- according to the art. 320
1paragraph 3 Code of crim. pr., the chairman shall ask the accused 
if he/she requires for the judgement to be carried out based on the evidence serviced during the 
criminal prosecution stage, evidence he/she acknowledges, or, based on the ordinary procedure and 
shall take note of the expressed position; 
- according to the art. 320 paragraph 2 Code of crim. pr., the chairman shall ask the prosecutor 
and the parties if they have formulated pleas, applications or if they propose new evidence; in case of 
a negative answer, the court declares the court investigation initiated, and such investigation shall be 
carried out according to the provisions of the art. 321 Code of crim. pr. 
- according to the art. 322 Code of crim. pr., the chairman shall order that the clerk to read or 
to make a summary of the court intimation deed. 
- according to the art. 323 Code of crim. pr., the court shall proceed to hearing the accused; if 
there are several accused, the hearing of each of them shall take place in the presence of the others. 
Practically, after hearing the accused, according to art. 323, art. 324 Code of crim. pr., the 
court shall be able to determine on the request of the accused to be judged based on the evidence 
serviced during the criminal prosecution, fully aware of the case details. 
Regardless of the means of action of the court, the disjunction regarding the other accused and 
the continuation of the trial, the statement of the accused opting for the simplified procedure shall 
have the value of evidence. 
After a careful reading of the provisions of the art. 320
1 Code of crim. pr., it can be noticed 
that under this aspect, the legislator points out two moments: the one in which the accused states that 
he/she opts for being judged based on the evidence serviced during the criminal prosecution, prior to 
commencing the court investigation and the one of hearing the accused that can only be realized as 
above-indicated.  
Of course, it would be possible for the accused that has submitted to the file the authentic 
statement, but is not present, to be brought in front of the court, if the court considers his/her present 
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What differentiates the two procedures is the fact that in the case of simplified procedure, the 
evidence gathered in the criminal prosecution no longer have to be services by the court, according to 
oralitaty, contradictoriality and publicity conditions, as provided for the regular procedure.  
As a matter of fact, we should not forget the reason of introducing such procedure that was 
grounded on some actual realities, the fact that the courts had to re-service the evidence during the 
criminal prosecution, even if the accused was admitting the actions for which he was undergoing 
trial. 
Another interpretation issue generated by the simplified procedure of the judgement in case of 
acknowledging the guilt results from the ambiguous content of the paragraph7 of the art. 320
1, also 
mentioned by the provisions of the art. 320
1 paragraphs 1-6 Code of crim. pr., the chairman does not 
apply  in  case  the  criminal  action  targets  an  offence  sanctioned  with  life  imprisonment,  leaving 
unregulated another situation much more often met in the practice, that is the one in which the law 
provides the sanction of life imprisonment, alternatively  with the imprisonment sanction for the 
committed offence.
If we take into account the fact that, upon the procedural moment when the legal provisions, 
regarding the guilt acknowledgement, can be applied (prior to the court investigation), the court 
cannot assess if the judgement to be passed is the sanction of life imprisonment or the imprisonment 
sanction, one might consider that the provisions of the art. 320
1 Code of crim. pr. are not applicable 
either if the criminal action targets an offense sanctionable with life imprisonment alternatively with 
the imprisonment sanction. 
However, if we take into account the fact that the legal provision above mentioned is of strict 
interpretation and application, the conclusion to be drawn is that the legislator, by the plea it has 
created, had in mind only the offences that are exclusively sanctioned with life imprisonment. 
In an interpretation per a contrario, in the case of committing the criminal offences for which 
the law provides the sanction of life imprisonment alternatively to the imprisonment sanction, the 
accused can benefit of the simplified procedure, if, based on the list of evidence serviced in the case, 
the court shall reach the conclusion that the life imprisonment is to apply, the guiding principle being 
that,  if  the  evidentiary  material  provides  data  based  on  which  the  court  considers  that  the  life 
imprisonment sanction should apply, even if it used the simplified procedure, the accused cannot 
benefit of it. 
Moreover, it is difficult for the court to accurately interpret and assess the possibility of an 
accused to benefit of the simplified procedure in the case of committing a series of criminal offences 
in which we have one offence punishable only by life imprisonment and another sanctionable only 
by imprisonment. 
In such a case, we consider that it is mandatory for the court to assess that the provisions of 
the art. 320
1 Code of crim. pr. are not applicable. 
However, we ask ourselves what would be the solution adopted in the practice in the above-
mentioned hypothesis when the accused acknowledges this/her guilt by reference to the criminal 
offence  for  which  the  law  provides  solely  the  imprisonment  sanction,  and  during  the  trial  the 
evidence leads to the inexistence of the accused guilt by reference to the offence sanctioned by life 
imprisonment, thus, in relation to such offence the court shall order the acquittal of the accused. Can 
the court still relate retroactively to the fact that the accused initially pleaded guilty for the offence 
sanctionable by imprisonment, thus as for the accused to benefit of the remission of his sanction 
limits, according to the simplified procedure? Because we could encounter such judicial errors that 
are not covered by our legal framework and for which the legislator and the judicial practice must 
clear such aspects. 
Another aspect that needs to be brought into discussion is the one regarding the means of 
applying the text of the art. 320
1 paragraph 3 Code of crim. pr., which provides that at the hearing 
“the court asks the accused if he/she requires the judgement to be made based on the evidence 
serviced during the criminal prosecution stage, evidence that he/she acknowledges and accepts, and 151
in such case it proceeds to hearing the accused and then it grants the permission to speak to the 
prosecutor and to the other parties”.
First of all, it does not clearly result what the hearing of the accused refers to, that is if it only 
concerns the aspect related to the judgment made based on the evidence services during the criminal 
prosecution stage or the hearing should also concern aspects related to the offence subjected to trial?  
From the text of the paragraph 1 of the art.320
1 C. crim. pro. that provides the fact that the 
accused can declare also by means of an authentic deed that he/she admits to have committed the 
offence held in the intimation, we could deduce that the hearing of the accused concerns solely the 
first aspect, related to the formal statement of admitting to have committed the offence and to the 
request for the judgement to be made based on the evidence serviced during the criminal prosecution 
stage.
The same interpretation would be also required by the fact that in this case it is not about a 
hearing carried out during the court investigation, as the text does not make any reference to reading 
the intimation, or to the commencement of the court investigation, but, on the contrary, from the 
paragraph 1 of the art. 320
1 Code of crim. pr. we deduce the fact that the entire procedure takes place 
“prior to the initiation of the court investigation”.
Moreover, the entire reasoning of the text, of simplification and expedition of the procedure 
for judging the cases in which the accused acknowledges the offences described in the indictment, 
might lead to the same conclusion, that the hearing only refers to the formal statement of admitting to 
have committed the offences described in the indictment and to the express request of the accused for 
the judgment to be carried out based on the evidence serviced during the criminal prosecution, which, 
of  course,  can  include  a  detailed  statement  of  the  accused  regarding  the  offence  referred  for 
settlement, to be considered upon judging the case. 
If we take into account the cases Colozza vs. Italy, Ilisescu and Chiforec vs. Romania, we can 
only conclude that the above-illustrated interpretation does not contravene to the ECHR case law in 
the matter, as the accused has expressly waived his/her right to be heard and to ask the hearing of 
witnesses in front of the court, in which case the right to a fair trial is not infringed. 
Secondly, the text does not clearly explain what it means to grant the permission to speak to 
the prosecutor and to the other parties: is the permission to speak is granted based on their statement 
on the case merits or only on the accused request, of settling the case based on the evidence serviced 
during the criminal prosecution?  
Based on the fact that the paragraph 6 of the art. 320
1 Code of crim. pr. expressly provides 
that in case of settlement of the file by means of this procedure, there shall be applied the provisions 
of the art. 340-344 Code of crim. pr. (referring to, among others, to granting the permission to speak 
during the debates and the last hearing being granted to the accused), we may implicitly conclude 
that the permission to speak granted to the prosecutor and to the other parties, after hearing the 
accused,  concerns  only  his/her  request  of  case  judgment  by  means  of  the  special  procedure  of 
pleading guilty. 
Further,  after  the  court  approved  this  request  of  the  accused,  the  court  would  grant  the 
permission to speak both during the debates on the case merits and the last intervention would be 
granted to the same. 
Another interpretation issue raised in the discussion is the one concerning the judgement to be 
ordered by the court in the case of applying the provisions of the art. 320
1 paragraph 7 Code of crim. 
pr..
By using the categorical formula of the legislator “the court shall determine the accused 
conviction” we might deduce that another solution than the conviction is not possible, even if there 
are grounds for acquittal, as provided by the art.10 C.of crim. proc., and, implicitly the accused 
acquittal based on the art. 10 let. b
1 Code of crim. pr., when the offence does not present the social 
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It is hard to believe that the legislator would have consider that the procedure of pleading 
guilty is incompatible to any other solution, other than the accused conviction, although the text 
leaves no room for interpretation.  
It might be ascertained that, for the case in which it intends to pass an acquittal, the court 
might dismiss the accused request to be judged based on the evidence serviced during the criminal 
prosecution stage and to carry on with the court investigation. 
In this case, if it intends to order the acquittal of the accused based on the art. 10 let. b
1 Code 
of crim. pr., it would be pretty difficult for the court to reason the dismissal of the accused request to 
apply the procedure under the art. 320
1 Code of crim. pr., without pre-empting on the judgment to be 
passed in the case. 
Moreover, the judiciary practice is to establish what happens in case a person, due to various 
considerations, takes  over himself  / herself the  liability  of  a  crime, that he/she  did not actually 
committed, requests for the judgement to be made based on the simplified procedure, the court orders 
conviction, within the remission limits, and after a while the true author of the crime is discovered?  
Shall it be considered that  the criminal  prosecution authorities have  committed a serious 
judiciary error that led to the considering that person as author of the criminal offence? Shall it be 
considered that the statement of the accused of pleading guilty represented major evidence, and thus 
the state authorities shall be exonerated of any liability by reference to the existing judiciary error, as 
long as the accused took over him/her the crime he / she hadn’t committed? 
Or, in case a person, that is not guilty, still pleads guilty, due to the lack of confidence in the 
impartiality  and  objectiveness  of  the  court,  the  procedural  conduct  of  pleading  guilty  only  for 
eliminating the possibility to receive a higher sanction, and later on, during the court investigation, it 
proves to be innocent, can there be considered the accused supporting statement, according to which 
he / she pleaded guilty, even if not guilty, because he/she was afraid of getting a higher sanction, for 
assessing the existence of a judiciary error? We will find an answer to this question again from the 
judiciary practice, the answer being imposed by the majority opinion. 
Another  problem  occurred  in  the  practice  is  represented  by  the  statement  of  guilt 
acknowledgement of the accused. In relation to such statement, it has been said that the accused must 
not acknowledge also the legal framing of the offence, such as held in the intimation, being able to 
ask for the legal framing of the same, according to art. 334 Code of crim. pr. 
Moreover, it has been stated that, considering the capacity of guarantor for the compliance 
with the right to a fair trial, the court may order the exclusion of the illegally or unfairly gathered 
evidence, even if the accused requested to be judged based on all the evidence gathered during the 
criminal prosecution stage. 
This opinion is questionable in the light of the aspect referring to the court opportunity to 
exclude, in this simplified procedure, certain evidence as illegally or unfairly gathered. Practically, a 
condition for the request admissibility is that the accused must not challenge such evidence, and the 
court must ascertained that the same was legally gathered. If the court shall ascertain the contrary, it 
must dismiss the request of the accused and must settle the case according to the ordinary procedure. 
As resulting from the content of the art. 320
1 Code of crim. pr., the only evidence to be 
serviced in this procedure are those in favour of the accused proving his/her bona fide conduct prior 
to such offence. 
The last paragraph of the article in discussion is also susceptible of leading to non-unitary 
interpretation by the fact that it does not enumerate, not even as an example, the causes for which the 
court might  dismiss the accused request  for applying the  procedure of the judgment in  case of 
pleading guilty.  
We could deduce from the paragraph 4 of the art. 320
1 Code of crim. pr. that such a request 
can be dismissed in case the evidence gathered during the criminal prosecution shows that the actions 
of the accused are not determined or when there are not enough evidence regarding the accused, for 
determining a sanction.  153
In lack of express provisions we consider that the request shall be analyzed by reference to the 
provisions of the art. 320 paragraph 4 Code of crim. pr., providing that the “trail court settles the 
criminal matter when, from the serviced evidence, it results that the accused actions are determined 
and there are sufficient data regarding his/her person for enabling the court to reach a verdict”.
Therefore, when the accused actions are not determined and there are not sufficient evidence 
regarding his/her person for enabling the court to reach a verdict, the court will be able to dismiss the 
request. Considering that all the citizens are equal in front of the law, as provided under the art. 16 of 
the Constitution, it can be considered that this provision is unconstitutional as it establishes different 
treatments between the accused whose request is allowed and the ones whose request is dismissed, 
the first ones benefiting of a substantial remission while the others do not, just because their actions 
are not determined and there are not sufficient evidence regarding their person for enabling the court 
to reach a verdict. 
However, considering the deficiencies occurred during the criminal prosecution cannot be 
imputable  to  the  accused,  there  is  no  reasoning  that  would  lead  to  the  conclusion  of  his  /  her 
,,sanctioning’’ by dismissing the request for applying such procedure, as it would implicitly render 
his / her impossibility to benefit of the remission of the sanction limits as provided by the law. 
It seems that a great deal of interpretation is left with the courts, when settling the accused 
request to be judged based on the evidence gathered during the criminal prosecution. 
This circumstance has a double nuance, consisting in both a positive aspect, if we refer to the 
attempt of eliminating the possibility that, due to different reasoning, the accused will acknowledge 
offences he did not commit, but also in a negative aspect if we take into account that, if, after the 
court investigation, the court reaches the conclusion that the accused really committed the offence, as 
described in the indictment, it can no longer apply the sanction within the limits of the remission, 
according to the art. 320
1 par. 7 Code of crim. pr.. 
Even if the text of law does not provide such a possibility, we deemed as correct the opinion 
according to which the accused must benefit of the legal cause for remission according to art. 320 
paragraph 7 Code of crim. pr., moreover, this happening in the situation in which, although he/she 
opted for the simplified procedure, the court dismissed the request and applied the common law rules 
regarding  the  judgement,  and,  on  the  occasion  of  deliberation  on  the  case,  after  analysing  the 
evidentiary material, has ascertained that the facts described in the indictment and acknowledged by 
the accused are proved beyond any doubt. 
A  major  aspect  is  the  corroboration  between  the  art.  320
1 Code  of  crim.  proc.  and  the 
provisions of the art.18 of the Law no. 508/2004 on the set up, organization and functioning within 
the Public Ministry of the Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism. 
Thus, according to the art.18 of the Law no. 508/2004: “the person committing one of the 
provided by the law under the jurisdiction of the Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and 
Terrorism, and during the criminal prosecution denounces and facilitates the identification and the 
holding criminally responsible other participants to the criminal offence benefit of the remission to 
half of the sanction provided by the law’’. 
Considering the fact that the art. 320
1 paragraph 7 C. crim. proc. provides the remission by 
one third of the sanctions provided by the law in the case of imprisonment sanction, there is one 
question to pose: how will the court act in case a person that committed a criminal offence provided 
by the Law no. 508/2004, has adopted a procedural attitude by which he/she has contributed, during 
the  criminal  prosecution,  to  the  identification  and  to  holding  criminally  responsible  other 
perpetrators, thus, becoming incidental the provisions of the art. 18 of the special law, and before the 
court,  prior  to  initiating  the  court  investigation,  he/she  maintains  the  same  honest  attitude  and 
understands to use the simplified procedure of pleading guilty? 
We consider that in the above-illustrated example, the court will have to pass a decision by 
which to order the application of the art. 320
1 paragraph 7 C. crim. proc. in relation to the accused 
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already reduced to half, according to the art.18 of the special law. Practically, in such a situation, the 
court should reduce the imprisonment sanction, to be applied to the accused, by two thirds. 
Conclusions 
These are only some of the issues raised by the application of the new text of the art. 320
1
Code of crim. pr., the discussions that can occur and the interpretations to be given, being definitely 
more than those above-mentioned. As any new institution, the judgment in the case of pleading guilty 
shall require a certain period of adjustment until the unitary practice in this matter shall be reached, 
especially that the text contains some inexact formulations, meant to create multiple interpretations.
Unfortunately, the courts do not yet benefit of a quick and effective mechanism for unifying the 
judiciary practice, fact that has affected and shall probably continue to affect the solutions adopted in 
this matter. 
We consider that for the new institution of judgment by pleading guilty, the adoption of some 
transitory norms would have been required, as being necessary for eliminating the controversies 
occurred and still to occur in the practice, as the possible interpretations to be given to the texts 
related to this institution can no longer refer to the prior Romanian case law and doctrine, and the 
consulting of the judgments from the comparative law is still a desideratum out of the reach of most 
of the interested ones. 
Although apparently simple, the means of settling the issue causes numerous consequences in 
the practice, consequences we deem solvable solely through the promotion and admission of recourse 
actions for judicial review that would render impossible to pass contrary judgments in similar cases, 
thus ensuring unitary judgments in the judiciary practice, for eliminating the discriminating verdicts, 
in which the same text of law is applied differently, although the situations are identical. 
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